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THE question whether and to what extent the federal Securities Act
ought to be amended has been recently brought to the fore by the
recommendations of the Special Committee of the American Bar As-
sociation on Amendments to the Securities Act of 1933 which were
adopted by the Association at its fifty-eighth Annual Meeting. To a
minor extent the questions with which those recommendations deal are
questions of draftsmanship-whether certain portions of the act fail to
express the legislative intent or to express such intent with sufficient
clarity, and whether these alleged defects are sufficiently important to
make amendment desirable. In the main, however, the committee's re-
port deals with the policy rather than with the draftsmanship of the
existing Act. It raises the broad questions of the appropriateness of the
present provisions of the Act for the protection of investors in corporate
securities and the extent, if any, to which those provisions burden dis-
tributors of securities with undue expense, unreasonably curb their
activities, or subject them to undue risks.
It is the purpose of the present article to set forth the considerations
which have led the writer to conclude that most of the committee's more
important proposals would be so detrimental to the interests of investors
that they ought not to be adopted. In order to make these considerations
intelligible, it is necessary, before discussing the committee's recommenda-
tions, to consider first of all the general character of our existing system
of security distribution and the dangers to the investor which are likely
to result from it. In so doing we may disregard such dangers as are
inherent in any system based on the assumption that investors ought to
be permitted to risk their money in speculative ventures, provided only
that the material facts relating to such ventures are adequately disclosed
to them, for that assumption is the underlying principle of the Act.
Although American methods of security distribution differ widely ac-
cording to the size of the corporation, the character of its securities and
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the special circumstances under which they are issued, there are certain
general features common to the distribution of most of the securities of
enterprises which are of sufficient size to cause them to make use of the
channels of interstate commerce in the selling process and thereby to
bring themselves within the purview of the federal Securities Act.
Such securities are sold chiefly to persons who are not in a position to
make any independent investigation of the facts on which the value of
the securities depend, but must rely for the most part on information
furnished to them, directly or indirectly, by the issuing corporation or by
other participants in the distribution process. This is not, indeed, true
of such facts as are external to the particular enterprise, such as the condi-
tion of the woolen industry or of industry in general, but it is almost
wholly true of the internal facts with respect to a new enterprise and
very largely true of the internal facts with respect to any enterprise, how-
ever well established. The experienced investor can do little more than
subject the statements and figures furnished by the corporation or its
bankers to careful scrutiny; the inexperienced investor-and it is the
inexperienced investor who furnishes a substantial portion of our modern
corporate capital-is incapable of even that limited form of investiga-
tion. Furthermore, particularly where the enterprise is large and has
been in operation for some time, the facts with regard to it are necessarily
so complicated that chances of serious error in any statement about them
are very great unless those who are responsible for making the state-
ments exercise a high degree of care.
Such being the case, legal protection against fraud alone is wholly
inadequate to fit the investor's needs. Being unable to ascertain the
facts for himself, he needs reasonable assurance that those who are in a
position to ascertain them shall, on the one hand, exercise care in dis-
covering and accuracy in stating the facts, and, on the other hand, give
him a statement so full as to furnish no opportunity for concealment of
facts that may be vital to a correct appraisal of the present value and
future prospects of the security which he is asked to buy. Although the
information furnished by the corporation or by the banking house which
originates the issue reaches only part of the investing public in the form
in which it is orginally given out, this information, being read by a sub-
stantial number of buyers and sellers of the security, affects investors
generally either by causing someone who has read it to advise them to
purchase, or more indirectly still, by producing a favorable public im-
pression of the security and creating a market price at which the investor
must buy if he buys at all. Disclosures which may be too complicated
and technical for the average investor to understand will nevertheless
benefit him through being understood by investors of greater experience.
For the inexperienced investor normally pays no more for the security
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than does his more experienced neighbor, it being the general practice
to have a uniform offering price.'
The orthodox common law doctrine which requires reliance on mis-
representations is ill adapted to meet the investor's needs unless reliance
be given a meaning wholly different from that which it has traditionally
had. In many cases all that the investor will be able to show is that an
important false statement was given wide currency at the time when
the securities were being offered to the public, and that, although neither
he nor the person from whom he bought had any knowledge of the
specific statement, he paid the current market price in a market which
could scarcely fail to have been influenced by the importance of the state-
ment and the wide publicity which had been given to it. Unless investors
are able to base a cause of action on a showing of this sort, many who
have suffered serious injury by reason of false or misleading statements
will be left without remedy.
Finally, the nature of corporate securities and the manner of their dis-
tribution create peculiar problems with respect to damages. Subject to
certain minor exceptions, it is our common law tradition to measure
damages in cases of misrepresentation as of the date when the plaintiff
acted upon the misrepresentation, and, where the misrepresentation in-
duced a sale, to measure these damages by deducting the actual value of
the thing bought either from the price actually paid or from an estimate of
the value which the thing bought would have had if the representations bad
been true.2 In most cases in which sales of readily marketable property
have been induced by misrepresentation, the market value of the thing sold
furnishes us with satisfactory evidence of its actual value. In the sale of
securities, however, the misrepresentations for which it is particularly im-
portant to give redress are those which are made so generally that they
affect the entire market and establish a market price which has little or no
relation to actual value. If, therefore, our rule of damages compels us to
ascertain the actual value of the securities on the date of purchase, we
must in so doing use evidence other than market value. The difficulty
of ascertaining in litigation which may arise several years after the
purchase, what the actual as distinct from the market value of the
security was at that time is likely to be well-nigh insuperable. Accord-
ingly, even where the problem has arisen at common law, the courts
have frequently abandoned the attempt to determine values as of the
date of purchase, and have sought to measure the investor's loss by taking
into consideration subsequent declines in the market value of the
1. There may, of course, be a group of insiders who are "let in on the ground floor"
and permitted to buy at a special bargain price.
2. The latter measure of damages is that generally adopted where the action is for
breach of warranty; each of the two measures has substantial support where the action
is for deceit. See WL~s-oN, S.urs (2d ed. 1924) §§ 613, 614.
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security. Although there seems to be no other practicable way of deal-
ing with the damage problem in a manner which will furnish adequate
protection to the investor, nevertheless this attempt to focus attention
upon subsequent events is subject to the objection that it will normally
be very difficult, if not impossible, to separate a fall in market value, due
to the public discovery of the erroneous character of a representation,
from a fall in market value due to other causes. Any rule of law which
would put on the investor the burden of establishing the extent to which
a fall in price was due to the original making and subsequent discovery
of the material false statement would, therefore, make it impossible for
many investors to prove a case where they have indubitably suffered
some loss as a result of the defendant's falsehood.4
We have been considering the problem thus far solely from the stand-
point of the needs of the investor. Obviously this is only one side of the
picture. Rules of law which may be necessary if all deserving investors
are to obtain a chance of legal redress may be unjust to distributors of
securities or unwise when considered from the broader viewpoint of the
welfare of the community as a whole. Rules which may be needed to
allow deserving plaintiffs to recover may open the door to recovery by a
host of undeserving plaintiffs as well. Even where this is not the case,
such rules may subject honest distributors of securities to unreasonable
expense and to unfair risks. By so doing they may increase the cost of
marketing securities to an extent which is not only disadvantageous to
the investor but injurious to the entire economic system of the country,
in that investment of capital in new industry may thus be hampered. If
carried to extremes, such rules may even make the business of selling new
securities so unattractive that long-term corporate financing will become
impossible.
The security distributors', side of the argument has, however, received
so much attention from writers who have dealt with the Securities Act,"
3. Whiting v. Price, 172 Mass. 240, 51 N. E. 1084 (1898); Hotaling v. A. B. Leach
& Co., Inc., 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (1928).
4. It may be that there are other practicable methods of control of security marketing
which would in the long run be of even more importance to the investor than a method
which seeks to compel disclosure and to give a remedy where damages have been suffered
by reason of misrepresentations or concealments. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933 (1933) 43 YA=, L. J. 171. However this may be, the importance
of requiring full information and of damage provisions which will both tend to Induce
compliance with this. requirement and give an effective remedy for non-complance Is
indisputable.
5. For articles written wholly or chiefly from the distributor's point of view see Ballantine,
Amending the Federal Securities Act (1934) 20 A. B. A. J. 247; Dean, The Federal Securitles
Act (Aug. 1933) 8 FoRTuNE 50; Dean, The Amended Securities Act (Sept. 1934) 10 FoaRoun
80. The act in its orginal form was so severe that even writers whose point of view was
much more detached tended to emphasize its harshness towards directors and underwriters.
See Douglas & Bates, supra note 4. But cf. Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act
(1933) 43 YALE L. J. 227.
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and is so dearly implicit in the recommendations of the Bar Association's
committee as to need but little further elaboration. The reasons why the
security buyer needs a special type of protection different from that given
to other buyers, and the precise character of those needs have been less
emphasized in the literature of the subject, but need to be understood
thoroughly in order that one may form an intelligent judgment as to the
desirability of the recommended changes in the Act.
The committee's recommendations are grouped under the various sec-
tions of the Act to which they relate, and a similar grouping will be
adopted in this article. We shall deal however, only with those sug-
gested amendments which appear to be of substantial importance.
Amendments to Section Two
Section 2 of the Securities Act is a definitional section. The com-
mittee's first recommendation is that that section be changed to give a
more limited meaning to the term "underwriter." It suggests that
"underwriter" as used in the Act be redefined so as to exempt from the
burdens now imposed upon underwriters those "true" underwriters who
"confine themselves merely to agreements to purchase outright such por-
tions of security issues as are not distributed to the public or other
security holders, and who do not participate in the actual distribution of
the issue in question." The committee further suggests that underwriters
so exempted be required to retain the securities underwritten for some
such period as six months.
The general purpose of the Securities Act is to render all persons
whose position makes them, or should make them closely associated with
the issue of a security, responsible for the correctness of the registration
statement and of a prospectus based thereon, and to subject to much less
severe burdens other persons who participate in the sale of securities to
the public, but are less closely connected with the issuing corporation.
It has long been customary in this country, particularly in the case of
the larger corporations, for prospectuses to be issued by investment
bankers, commonly known as originating houses, rather than by the
corporations themselves, and for the public to rely to a large extent
upon the reputation of these bankers rather than upon that of the
corporate management in purchasing securities. The relations between
such bankers and the issuing corporations make it entirely practicable for
the former to obtain full information about the enterprises which they
are sponsoring. For these reasons, the Act seeks to subject persons who
are substantially in the position of such bankers to responsibility for
the registration statement and the prospectus. The basis for this re-
sponsibility is threefold: that such bankers participate as wholesale and
frequently as retail security merchants in the distribution process; that
they are normally in close contact with the corporation and able through
19351
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their direct dealings with it to obtain information, if not, indeed, actually
controlling its security-issuing activities; and finally that they are the
sort of persons whose names the public expects to find on prospectuses.
The method adopted in the act for bringing such bankers within the
scope of its registration and prospectus provisions is to make all under-
writers responsible for the registration statement and then to give, in
Section 2 (11), a very broad definition of the term "underwriter." Under
the definition as it now stands, "any person who has purchased from an
issuer with a view to ... the distribution of any security or participates
or has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking" is in-
cluded within the term "underwriter." As the committee indicates, this
definition would appear to include "true" or "English type" underwriters,
who agree to purchase such portion of the issue as is not sold to the
public. These underwriters do not participate directly in the selling
process unless some portion of the issue remains unsold to others, in
which event they are themselves obliged to purchase that unsold portion
and may resell it. If such underwriters disassociate themselves com-
pletely from the selling process, do not permit their names to be used on
a prospectus or otherwise as sponsoring the issue, and do not even permit
a public announcement to be made that they are underwriting it, there is
force in the argument that they should not, merely because of their
underwriting agreement, be treated as parties to the registration state-
ment. If the public takes all the securities which are being marketed,
these underwriters have not dealt with the public at all, but have merely
earned a commission for acting as insurers.
On the other hand, if the underwriters are obliged to take some of the
securities themselves, they are likely to seek to resell these securities to
the public. If exempted altogether from the liabilities imposed upon
underwriters, they could under these circumstances resell their securities
with no legal responsibilities under the Act except those imposed upon
ordinary dealers by Section 12. That section imposes upon them no
duty of disclosure and no liability for misrepresentations except liability
to persons purchasing directly from them by means of the mails or some
instrumentalities of interstate commerce. To enable an investment
banker whose business relations with the issuing corporation may be very
close and whose sponsorship of an issue may carry great weight with the
public to reduce his liabilities to those of an ordinary retail dealer, merely
because the issuing corporation has made an abortive attempt to market
the issue through other channels, would be so inconsistent with the
purposes of the Act that substantial safeguards must be provided if the
committee's recommendation is to be adopted. The committee suggests
that in order to obviate the employment of "true" underwriters as a de-
vice to evade the Act, such underwriters should be required to retain, for
some such period as six months, the securities which they have been corn-
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pelled to purchase as a result of their underwriting. This suggestion, if
coupled with a very broad definition of what is meant by "participation,"
would eliminate much of the objection to exempting "true" underwriters
from responsibility for the registration statement. It may be doubted,
however, whether the risk of thereby encouraging evasion would not still
be substantial. Furthermore, although underwriting is a socially useful
activity, it may be questioned whether encouragement of this particular
type of underwriting is of sufficient importance to the community to
justify the complications which it would introduce into the administra-
tion and enforcement of the Act.'
The committee also suggests the insertion in Section 2 of a definition
of the phrase "public offering." Although Section 4 of the Act exempts
from most of its provisions "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering," the Act nowhere states what is meant by a public of-
fering. The Federal Trade Commission, which was charged with the
administration of the Act previous to the time the Securities and Ex-
change Commission took over that function, has ruled that an offer need
not be made to the public generally in order that it be public, an offer
to a particular group such as the corporation's own employees being
public within the meaning of the Act if the class is large.7 The Securities
and Exchange Commission has made no change in this ruling.
The committee dissents vehemently from the ruling and suggests a
definition of "public offering" which would eliminate issues "confined
solely to the holders of the issuer's securities or to the employees of the
issuer or to the creditors of the issuer." The committee urges in sup-
port of its view that members of these classes either have full informa-
tion or facilities for obtaining such information with respect to the
issuer and the security, and that the filing of a registration statement is
accordingly unnecessary.
Stockholders do, of course, have a theoretical legal right to examine
the books of the corporation. But no one knows better than the eminent
corporation lawyers who are members of the committee that, at least in
corporations of substantial size, the expense of exercising this right is so
great that it is utterly impracticable for the average stockholder, when
6. The position is taken below that offers to special classes, such as stockholders and
employees, require registration under the Act if the class is large. There is, however, fre-
quently a real business need of an underwriting agreement in connection with such offers,
and this agreement must necessarily be of the true or English type. Even to one who iz,
like the writer, strongly impressed with the wide gulf which, in the modem publicly-financed
corporation, separates the individual stockholder from the management, a rule which makes
an underwriter responsible for what the management tells the stockholders when it offers
them rights to subscribe to new issues seems unreasonable. As applied to this particular
situation, the committee's plea for exempting true underwriters is persuasive.
7. See Fed. Trade Comm. Release, No. 97, Dec. 28, 1933, taking the view that a pro-
posed offering of stock to 2450 employees of a corporation is a public offering.
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offered a new issue of securities of his corporation, to examine the books
in order to determine- whether it would be wise for him to subscribe.
Apart from this right to examine the books, and from the right given by
the corporation laws of a few states to insist upon receiving an annual
report, generally of a rather meagre character, a stockholder who has no
close relations with the management has no sources of information other
than those available to the general public.
Theoretically, it might seem that any excessive price which stock-
holders may be induced, by misrepresentation or non-disclosure, to pay
will enrich the corporation and hence come back to the stockholders in
the long run, but practically there will be many situations in which this
will not be true.8 Furthermore, although the fiduciary obligations which
the directors owe to the corporation, and to a lesser extent to the stock-
holders, may furnish a stockholder who has been induced by misrepre-
sentation to purchase additional securities some remedies not available
to an outside buyer, nevertheless, what the stockholder needs is not a
chance to purchase a lawsuit but opportunity to obtain sufficient in-
formation in advance to enable him to determine whether it is wise for
him to purchase anything.
The fact is that our state corporation laws and the legal and equitable
principles which our courts have developed in connection with them do
not give the stockholders in our large corporations, in which control
and ownership are almost completely divorced, adequate means of ob-
taining reliable information with respect to corporate affairs. Effective
reform through state legislation is unlikely so long as the states are
bidding against one another for the favor of corporate promoters and so
long as our corporation statutes are drafted on the theory that there is no
legal distinction between an enterprise with five stockholders and one
with five hundred thousand. Federal statutes have given the stock-
holders of many of our corporations as well as the general public new
opportunities for obtaining information by authorizing the Interstate
Commerce Commission to require periodic public reports from railroads,
and the Securities and Exchange Commission to require such reports from
all corporations whose securities are listed on an exchange.9 There are,
however, many important corporations which are immune from regula-
tion under those statutes but which come within the purview of the
Securities Act whenever they are issuing additional securities. The stock-
holder's need of information, acute at all times, is peculiarly so when he
8. The purpose of the issue may be to provide funds for expenditures which may be
unlikely to benefit the stockholders; insiders may be given extravagant underwriting or
other commissions in connection with the issue; it may be offered to one class of stock.
holders on terms which are unfair to some other class.
9. See § 20 of the INTmsTATE COMMERCE AcT, 34 STAT. 593 (1906), 49 U. S. C. A. § 20
(1929), and § 13 of the SEcuaRrs Excmonm AcT, 48 STAT. 894, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78m
(1934).
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is being asked to invest additional funds in the corporate enterprise. To
give him a right to information at that stage, through the Securities Act,
is not only beneficial in compelling disclosure to him, but may be even
more beneficial indirectly in tending to destroy the vicious notion which
has generally prevailed that much which is going on behind the scenes in
our large, publicly-owned corporations-the payment of huge managerial
bonuses, for example-may with propriety be concealed even from those
members of the public who are the owners of the enterprise.
Creditors do not, as such, have any special legal rights to information.
No doubt those large creditors who are in a position to threaten the cor-
poration with inconvenient demands for payment, or with equally in-
convenient withholding of further credits, are generally able to obtain a
great deal of information. This is not true of most small creditors,
however, and any assumption that large creditors will look out for the
interests of the entire class is certainly unwarranted."0
As for employees, those occupying the higher salaried positions doubt-
less have special means of information, but offers of securities to em-
ployees are frequently made to those whose position in the organization
is so humble that they would not dare to ask for any information other
than that which the management chose to give them. Such employees
may not only be asked to subscribe without being told the relevant facts;
they may be, and sometimes are, practically forced to subscribe for fear
of losing their positions or incurring the ill will of the management if
they refuse. Where the management's desire not to antagonize its em-
ployees by forcing them to buy undesirable securities is outweighed by
its eagerness to obtain funds for a corporation whose securities are dif-
ficult to market, the employees' need of legal protection is very great.
That such cases are rare ought not lightly to be assumed.
It is true that where an issue is made to a limited class such as stock-
holders, creditors, or employees, a registration statement will not have
the effect which it normally has of establishing a general market price3 '
To require that a management which attempts to make such an issue
shall place on file with the Commission a public statement of the im-
portant facts concerning the enterprise and shall incorporate the sub-
stance thereof in a prospectus issued to the class in question, will never-
theless act as a very effective deterrent against fraud and over-reaching.
The construction which the Federal Trade Commission has placed upon
10. In suggesting a definition of "public offering" which would exclude offers to creditors,
the committee presumably did not have in mind offers made to creditors in the courze
of a reorganization in equity or under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, a matter it
has dealt with elsewhere.
11. Public disclosure made in connection with an issue to stockholders will indirectly
tend to establish a general market price where, as is usually the case with corporations




the words "public offering" may be undesirably vague and may result in
making some useful transactions unduly expensive, but to insert in the
Securities Act a definition of "public offering" which would exclude all
offers to stockholders, creditors, or employees, however numerous or
ill-informed, would not be to reform the existing vagueness but largely
to defeat the purpose of the Act.
Amendments to Section Three
The committee recommends that subclause (9) of Section 3a, which
exempts certain exchanges of securities, be broadened so as clearly to
exempt securities issued to existing security holders in connection with
a statutory merger or consolidation, and also to exempt securities of a
buying corporation issued to security holders of a selling corporation in
connection with a sale of the assets of the latter. Since the date of the
committee's report, the Commission has issued a ruling to the effect that,
under ordinary circumstances, such issues do not constitute "sales"
within the meaning of the Securities Act and accordingly do not require
registration. 2 Without questioning the correctness of this ruling as a
construction of the existing Act,'3 it may well be doubted whether the
result thus achieved is a desirable one. The law reports are unhappily
full of cases in which mergers, consolidations, and sales of assets, grossly
unfair in their terms to one of the corporations concerned or to some
class of its security holders, have been attempted. Our law relating to
sales of assets, which is in most states a much more common method of
combination than statutory merger or consolidation, is based on the as-
sumption that the managements of the buying and of the selling corpora-
12. See Securities and Exchange Commission' Release, No. 493, Sept. 20, 1935, relating
to use of form E-1.
13. If such transactions were held to involve sales to stockholders which could not
lawfully be made without prior registration of the securities, it would be necessary to
determine when such sales take place. Where one corporation sells its assets to another for
stock of the buyer which is issued to the seller and subsequently distributed by it to its
stockholders, it would seem that the only part of the transaction which could with any
show of reason be deemed a sale to the stockholders would be the final act of distribution.
The issue to the selling corporation, although probably constituting a sale to it, would be
an exempt transaction under § 4 of the Act unless the fact that subsequent distribution
to the seller's stockholders was contemplated would make the transaction one involving a
public offering. It would also be exempt under § 5 unless the mails or instrumentalities
of interstate commerce were used. It would be difficult, therefore, to construe the Act
as requiring registration and disclosure prior to the transaction between the two corpora-
tions. Conceivably the subsequent distribution by the seller of the buyer's stock might
constitute a sale, but it would be of little value to the stockholder to require disclosure
at that stage of the proceedings. It seems reasonably clear that, whatever construction
be put upon it, the Securities Act in its present form does not furnish a workable method
of requiring disclosure to stockholders who are asked to vote on a merger, consolidation,
or sale of assets.
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tions, trading at arm's length, make a tentative deal for the purchase by
the buyer of the seller's assets, generally for shares of the buyer's stock
to be distributed to the seller's stockholders.14 This tentative proposi-
tion is then submitted to the seller's stockholders, who must approve it
by vote of a majority or some larger percentage of outstanding shares.
In the negotiations between managements, neither side has any right to
information, but each has the trader's power of refusing to deal unless
given a full statement of facts about the other's enterprise. When the
matter has reached the stage where it is ripe for a vote by the seller's
stockholders, these stockholders have, apart from their right to examine
the books of their own corporation, no right to be informed of anything
except the terms of the sale agreement, but they can in theory protect
themselves by refusing to vote in favor of the sale unless their directors
furnish them satisfactory data with respect to both corporations.
The actual situation is usually quite different from the theoretical one.
In many, perhaps in most cases,1s the prospective buyer acquires a work-
ing control over the prospective seller before the negotiations begin,
which means that the officers and directors of the seller cannot be re-
lied upon to safeguard its interests in those negotiations. If this control
is carried far enough to give the buying corporation the necessary statu-
tory majority in the selling corporation, no disclosure of any kind to
stockholders is necessary. Even where this is not the case, the trouble
and expense which stockholders would incur in an attempt to obtain
adequate information is so great that they are generally obliged to vote
on the transaction with only such data as the management of their
corporation chooses to give them. Those stockholders who vote in
favor of the sale are then bound by their assent, and, in the absence of
an appraisal right which in many states does not exist,1" those who dis-
sent are also -bound unless they can establish fraud in a suit in equity.
In cases in which the buying corporation was not in complete control
of the seller, compulsory disclosure of the facts relating to both buying
14. Under most state laws, the proper practice would seem to be for the buyer's stocl:
to be issued to the selling corporation, and for the latter corporation, after acquiring this
stock, to hold a second stockholders' meeting to determine whether that corporation should
be dissolved and the stock which it has acquired distributed to its stockholders. Finch v.
Warrior Cement Corp., 16 Del. Ch. 44, 141 At. 54 (1928); Geiger v. American Seeding
Machine Co., 124 Ohio St. 222, 177 N. E. 594 (1931). But cf. Orno CooE A.:. (Throck-
morton, 1934) §§ S623-65. It is, however, a very common practice to issue the stock of
the buying corporation directly to the stockholders of the selling corporation.
15. See Stone, J., dissenting, in Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Electric Co. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 291 U. S. 587, 600 (1934).
16. In such important corporation states as Delaware and Michigan, for example, there
is no right of appraisal where corporations are combined by sale of the assets of one for
stock of the other rather than by statutory merger or consolidation. See Delaware Laws,.
1929, p. 397, § 64A; MlCE. Comm'. LAws (1929) §§ 10135-57.
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and selling corporations would make it more difficult to obtain the neces-
sary majority vote in favor of a sale where the terms were unfair. Even
where the buyer owned or controlled the necessary majority of the seller's
shares, such disclosure would still tend to prevent consummation of the
deal by furnishing the minority with adequate data on which to base
successful lawsuits. The states have thus far shown no tendency to enact
legislation which is at all adequate to assure stockholders of the informa-
tion which they need in connection with sales of assets or statutory
mergers and consolidations. If it is legitimate for the federal govern-
ment through the Securities Act to remedy the defects of state laws
which cover other types of stock issues and to require disclosure in con-
nection therewith, it would seem equally legitimate for it, either through
amendment of the Securities Act or enactment of a separate statute, to
remedy the defects in our state laws governing sales of assets, mergers,
and consolidations by requiring similar disclosures in connection with
such transactions. Incidentally, the effect of such a requirement of
public disclosure might be to discourage many of such transactions
which, although not injurious to the interests of existing shareholders in
either corporation, are in other ways detrimental to the public interests."
The committee also proposes an amendment of subclause (10) of
Section 3a which would, if adopted, exempt from registration certificates
of deposit issued in connection with a corporate reorganization carried
out either through equity receivership or under Section 77B of the Bank-
ruptcy Act. The present form of the clause exempts securities issued in
exchange for those which are already outstanding where the terms and
conditions of the exchange are approved by court or commission after
a hearing.18 In the case of equity and bankruptcy reorganizations, there
is a court hearing with respect to the reorganization plan and the securi-
ties to be issued under it, but there is not ordinarily any court hearing
with respect to certificates of deposit, which are issued as part of the
machinery for mobilizing majority support in favor of a plan.
The committee's proposal to exempt such certificates from registra-
tion is based on the assumption that court approval of reorganizations in
equity and under Section 77B furnishes an adequate safeguard for in-
vestors. Since it seems probable that most future reorganizations of
corporations, other than railroads, banks, and insurance companies, will
17. Mergers, consolidations, and sales are frequently made the occasion for marking up
assets and watering of stock. If this watered stock is distributed fairly among existing
shareholders, the result may be to increase the market value of their shares, benefiting them
temporarily at least, at the expense of subsequent purchasers and possibly, if the enterprise
is a public utility operating or holding company, at the expense of consumers.
18. A somewhat ambiguous provision in subdivision (h) of Section 77B has been con-
strued by the Securities and Exchange Commission in a manner which leaves this situation
unchanged. Securities & Exchange Comm. Release, No. 296, Feb. 14, 1935.
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be effected under Section 77B, the practical problem is one of the ef-
fectivenesi of the judicial procedure under that section to safeguard
security holders and creditors participating in a reorganization if the
present requirement of registration of certificates of deposit were
eliminated.
Section 77B gives the courts powers of a very broad character in con-
nection with reorganizations. Although it is expressly provided in sub-
division (b) that a creditor may act through a duly authorized agent
or committee, the judge may
"disregard any limitations or provisions of any depositary agreements,
trust indentures, committee or other authorizations affecting any creditor
acting under this Section and may enforce an accounting thereunder or
restrain the exercise of any power which he finds to be unfair or not con-
sistent with public policy, and may limit any claims filed by such com-
mittee member or agent to the actual consideration paid therefor."
Furthermore, although a duly authorized committee may assent to a
reorganization plan on behalf of the stockholders or creditors whom the
committee represents, the plan cannot be carried out unless the judge
has found, after hearing such objections as may be made, that the plan
is fair, equitable, non-discriminatory, and feasible. Subdivision (c) pro-
vides that any creditor or stockholder is entitled to be heard "on the
proposed confirmation of any reorganization plan." This provision may
conceivably be broad enough to entitle a creditor, who has previously be-
come a party to a deposit agreement purporting to confer upon a com-
mittee an irrevocable power to assent to the plan on his behalf, to appear
in opposition to the plan at the hearing. Subdivision (f) provides that
the plan shall not be confirmed unless the judge finds that "all amounts
to be paid to committees or reorganization managers ... have been fully
disclosed and are reasonable or are 'to be subject to the approval of the
judge," and subdivision (c) (9) provides that the judge "may allow
reasonable compensation for the services rendered and reimbursement
for the actual and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the
proceeding and the plan by officers, parties in interest, depositaries, re-
organization managers and committees, or other representatives of credi-
tors or stockholders, and the attorneys or agents of any of the foregoing
and of the debtor." A recent amendment to subdivision (e) (1) em-
powers the judge to require the filing of information with respect to
speculation in securities by committees and others who accept a re-
organization plan. 9
Although these powers appear on their face to be broad enough to
give the judge a far-reaching control over the whole process of reorgan-
ization, they are limited in actual operation by the unavoidable tendency
19. See 49 STAr. 809 (1935).
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,of judges to assume that deposit agreements are fair, that committees
are devoting themselves single-mindedly to protect the interests of their
depositors, that fees are reasonable, and that reorganization plans are
equitable, unless some security holder or creditor appears in court and
directly challenges one or more of these assumptions. The judge has
no administrative machinery which he can use for investigating ques-
tions of this sort, and the trustee, even when one is appointed, is
,ordinarily so absorbed in operating the business that any attempt to use
him as the eyes of the court for looking into the activities of committees
would be impracticable. Experience with equity receiverships strongly
indicates that the ordinary security holder and creditor has such a feel-
ing of helplessness and so great an unwillingness to throw good money
-after bad by making expensive investigations or indulging in expensive
litigation that he will normally do whatever a committee with a reason-
ably impressive-sounding list of members asks him to do. Protests are
made, if at all, only by small minorities who thus appear to the judge
to be in the position of attacking what the majority want.
It is this situation rather than any lack of power on the part of equity
,courts that is responsible for many of the evils which have arisen in con-
nection with equity reorganizations. Although our experience with re-
,organization under Section 77B has been short, there is reason to believe
that the situation has been only slightly changed by the enactment of
that section. It is true that dissenters can no longer be left out of a
reorganization so that the pressure upon the individual claimant to
deposit with a particular committee and thus join the majority has been
,considerably relaxed. It is true also that under the new procedure the
judge is not as likely as he was under the old to wait until a majority
of each class have deposited with a particular committee before passing
on the merits of a reorganization plan, since subdivision (d) of Section
77B authorizes him to consider a plan approved by a certain percentage
of creditors or stockholders, or proposed by the debtor, although the
plan has not yet been accepted by a majority of any class. It still re-
mains true, however, that the judge is not usually in a position to act for
the protection of the security holders unless someone is objecting, and
that where there are committees whose membership is such as to give
them considerable prestige, the objections to anything which they have
done will normally be made by relatively small minorities, if made at
all. Furthermore, they will be made by minorities who, in the absence
of legal requirements such as those now contained in the Securities Act
for public disclosure by committees, will have great difficulty in finding
-out the facts.
The kinds of harm which may come to security holders and creditors
from non-disclosure by committees who are soliciting deposit of securi-
ties are many and various. The members of the committee may, unkown
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to the security holders, have such present or past connections with other
parties concerned in the reorganization as to make them unfit representa-
tives of the particular class of claimants whose claims they are seeking
to have deposited with them. Unknown to the intending depositors, the
committee may have prevented them from getting impartial advice as to
the desirability of depositing by offering a commission on deposits ob-
tained to such persons as brokers and local security dealers, to whom
the investor is likely to turn for advice. The deposit agreement may
contain provisions not easily detected or understood by the ordinary in-
vestor which may confer upon the committee unreasonable powers, un-
fair immunities, and excessive remuneration. -0
The Securities Act, and the form for registration of certificates of
deposit which the Securities and Exchange Commission has evolved
pursuant to the provisions of the Act2 l attack this problem directly by
requiring disclosure of facts which the investor may need to know about
the committee, the deposit agreement, the progress of the reorganization,
and the corporation to be reorganized. If certificates of deposit were
exempted from the requirements of the Securities Act, the dangers re-
sulting from misrepresentation and non-disclosure by committees could
be dealt with only indirectly. Subject only to the ordinary law of fraud,
committees would be able to say what they please, and to conceal as
much as they please from the security holders whom they seek to repre-
sent. Judges would then be expected to exercise their powers in such a
way as to prevent committees who had secured deposits by unfair means
from abusing their powers and from injuring the security holders either by
misconduct or lack of zeal.
Even if efficient administrative machinery for investigating the facts
relating to reorganizations should be provided and courts thus no longer
be compelled to rely almost entirely on such facts as may be brought to
light by a few militant dissenters, the exemption suggested would be
unjustified. Investors would still have much reason to contend that they
are entitled to know enough facts to enable them to determine intelligently
for themselves whether or not to authorize a committee to represent them
by means of a deposit of securities with it, and that the paternalistic
efforts of a court or an administrative body to see that their deposits,
20. Lowenthal, The Stock Exchange and Protective Commiutee Securities (1933) 33 COL.
. R-v. 1923; cf. Dodd, Reorganization through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What? (1935)
48 HARv. L. Rv. 1100.
21. Form 14. The Interstate Commerce Commission, acting under the broad powers
-conferred upon it by the amended Railroad Reorganization Act, 48 SrAT. 912, 11 U. S. C. A.
§ 20 5p (1934), has recently issued regulations requiring protective committees and others
-who solicit proxies or deposits in connection with railroad reorganizations to file with
-the Commission detailed information somewhat similar to that called for by Form 14.
See N. Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1935, p. 34.
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made in ignorance of many important facts, should do them no harm,
are an unsatisfactory substitute for their own opportunity to make an in-
telligent decision.22 Under the present state of things, protection of the
investor's interests even more clearly requires that the law insist upon
adequate disclosures by committees. Careful scrutiny of the form
which the Commission has adopted for registration of certificates of
deposit does not, to the writer at least, indicate that the disclosures re-
quired are unduly burdensome or expensive, or unreasonably inquisi-
torial. A desire to make reorganizations quick, easy, and inexpensive
is a laudable one, but there is little reason to believe that these objects
are seriously interfered with by requiring the present form of registration
statement from committees soliciting deposits. 23
In fact one may go further and insist that the real objection to the
Securities Act as applied to reorganizations is not that it gives the Com-
mission too much control over certificates of deposits and other similar
instruments, but too little. As the Act now stands, certificates of deposit
are exempt from registration where there has been a judicial hearing at
which the terms and conditions on which the certificates are to be issued
have been found to be fair. Furthermore, such documents as powers of
attorney or proxies which accomplish much the same purpose as cer-
tificates of deposit but are not technically securities are also exempt from
registration. The dangers to investors which result from such exemp-
tions have been discussed elsewhere. 24
Amendments to Section Eleven
The next important group of recommendations made by the com-
mittee relate to Section 11, which deals with civil liabilty for errors and
22. There are those who would go even further in the direction of governmental pater-
nalism than is here suggested and would abolish committees altogether and vest plenary
powers over reorganizations in some federal administrative agency, with provisions for
judicial review. The assumption that the interests of security holders and creditors would
receive better protection from a bureaucracy, probably underpaid and politically appointed,
than from committees whose members may be, and often are, substantial holders of the
class of claims which they represent, seems to the writer to be wholly unwarranted. Cf.
Douglas, Protective Committees in Railroad Reorganizations (1934) 47 HARV. L. REv. 565,
583. Nor is the argument that the general public, as well as existing creditors and stock-
holders, has interests in reorganizations which deserve protection particularly persuasive
in the case of the smaller enterprises whose existence could be terminated without serious
public inconvenience.
23. Section 211 of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 STAr. 909, 15 U. S. C. A. § 78jI (1934),
directs the Commission to make a study of protective and reorganization committees and
report the results of its studies and its recommendations to Congress on or before January
3, 1936. Clearly, no amendment of the Securities Act which would exempt certificates of
deposit issued by such committees should be adopted until the Commission has made
its report.
24. See Dodd, supra note 20, at 1120 et seq.
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omissions in the registration statement. The section in its present form
imposes liability if any part of the registration statement, "when such
part became effective, contained an untrue statement of a material fact
or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or neces-
sary to make the statements therein not misleading." The Act is thus
aimed at three kinds of statements, those which are directly false, those
which are incomplete by reason of the fact that they omit something
-which the Securities Act requires to be stated, and those which are in-
complete in the sense that the omission of certain facts renders the state-
ments actually made misleading, although literally true. In any case,
however, there is no liability unless the statement or omission was suf-
ficiently important to be material.
The committee suggests the substitution of language found in Section
18a of the Securities Exchange Act imposing liability for a statement
which "was at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which
it was made false or misleading with respect to any material fact." The
change suggested would apparently have three consequences. In the first
place it would make it clearer than it is at present, that the materiality
and the misleading character of statements should be judged as of the
time when they were made. This date would apparently be either the
date when the registration was filed or the date when it became ef-
fective. In the second place it would apparently limit the liability, which
now exists for omission of material facts required to be stated, to cases
in which such omissions rendered misleading the statements actually
made. Finally, it would change the form and possibly slightly change
the substance of the provision relating to omissions of facts which are
not expressly required to be stated, but are necessary in order to prevent
the statements from being misleading. These three points require
separate treatment.
With respect to the first point, it may be assumed that no liability
ought to be imposed on anyone for a misrepresentation in a registration
statement about a fact which no reasonable man would have regarded as
important at the date on which the particular plaintiff purchased his
securities. Even if the representation was fraudulently made and subse-
quent events made the misstated fact unexpectedly important, the state-
ment could hardly have been, even indirectly, the inducing cause of the
plaintiff's purchase. To impose liability would, therefore, be punitive,
not compensatory. It is less obvious that there should be no liability
where the misstatement, apparently unimportant when made, becomes
important by reason of events which occur between the making of the
registration statement and the plaintiff's purchase of securities. Persons
who know that their statements are false might well be held to run the
risk that they may become material before they are acted on. However,
since the Act imposes liability for negligence as well as for fraud, places
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the burden on the defendants to prove due care, and does not re-
quire reliance by the plaintiff, it may be unduly harsh in both situations
to permit recovery for misstatements which were unimportant when
made. But to assume that the Act will be construed in such a manner as
to determine materiality as of some later date, although it expressly
creates liability only where some part of a registration statement con-
tained a material untruth "when such part became effective, 25 is to
assume a perverse desire on the part of judges to distort the normal
meaning of words in order to reach an unreasonable result.
With respect to the second point, it should be noted that Congress has
made it the statutory duty of issuers of securities and persons associated
with them to give investors, through the registration statement and the
,prospectus,26 the specific information called for by Schedule A of the Act.
Thus, except in cases in which the Securities and Exchange Commission
requires the inclusion in the registration statement of additional informa-
tion not contained in Schedule A,27 the omission of any fact required to
be stated means the omission of some fact which Congress has specifically
declared to be one about which investors are entitled to be informed.
Section 11 in its present form provides that, if the fact so omitted is
material, any investor who has suffered damage may recover in the
absence of proof that the omission was not the cause of his injury.
Liability is thus imposed for a material breach of a clearly defined
statutory duty resulting in damage.
Under the committee's suggested amendment, on the other hand, there
could be no recovery even where such an omission related to a material
fact unless it could be further shown that the omission made the state-
ment false or misleading. Obviously, such a change would substantially
weaken the protection given to investors. To take a single illustration,
one of the requirements of Schedule A is that the names of all persons
25. As a general rule, a registration statement becomes effective on the twentieth day
after filing. See Section 8 of the Securities Act.
26. Under Section 5b of the Act, registered securities cannot be sent through the malls
or in interstate commerce for purposes of sale unless accompanied or preceded by a
statutory prospectus. Under Section 10 of the Act, such prospectus must in general con-
tain all the statements made in the registration statement, although the Commission has
some power to expand or contract the prospectus.
27. Section 7 provides that the registration statement shall contain such other informa-
tion, not contained in Schedule A, "as the Commission may by rules or regulations require
as being necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."
Schedule A requires so much information that it is unlikely that the Commission will ever
require more, except where the security is of such a peculiar type that the provisions of
Schedule A are not well suited to it.
Section 7 also authorizes the Commission by rule or regulation to authorize the omission
from the registration statement of any information if it finds, with respect to any class
of issuers or security, that such information is inapplicable to such class and that adequate
disclosure may be made without it.
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owning more than ten percent of the issuer's stock be given. One can
readily conceive of a case in which stock control of the issuer might be
in a person whose reputation was such that no prudent investor would
risk funds in any enterprise dominated by him. Under these circum-
stances omission to state the stock holdings of such person would plainly
be material, and yet it could hardly be said that such an omission would
make the remainder of the registration statement-which is composed
largely of such matters as balance sheets and income statements-false
or misleading.
It is true, as the committee points out, that the phraseology which it
suggests has been adopted in the civil liability section of the Securities
Exchange Act. That is no reason for incorporating it into the
Securities Act, however, unless it can be shown that, as applied to the
particular problem involved in the latter act, the much weaker rule of
liability established by the Securities Exchange Act is more just
than the rule now embodied in the Securities Act. Whether the Securi-
ties Exchange Act rule is a sound one as applied to the quite dif-
ferent situation presented by that Act is another question which need
not be dealt with here.2
The third point concerns the other type of omission-omission of facts
not specifically required to be stated but necessary to prevent the state-
ments made from being misleading. Such omissions are dealt with in the
Securities Exchange Act by imposing liability for misleading statements,
and in the Securities Act by imposing liability for omissions which make
statements misleading. The two provisions are very similar. The com-
mittee may be right in thinking that the language of the Securities Act
gives a shade more encouragement than that of the other act to a court
which might desire to give the Act a broad interpretation. If so, one's
choice between the two forms of words will naturally be determined by
whether one feels that the judicial tendency is likely to be to extend
28. The section in question, Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act, 48 Sr. r. 897,
15 U. S. C. A. § 78r (1934), imposes liability for misrepresentations "in any application,
report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter." This would seem to include registra-
tion statements filed by security exchanges under § 6, applications for registration of
securities on an exchange under § 12, periodical reports of issuers under § 13, solicitations
of proxies under § 14, statements of stock ownership by directors and others under 9 16,
and reports by brokers and others under § 17. The scope of these various statements is
left largely to the judgment of the Commission so that no one has a statutory right to
any particular form of statement. Under such circumstances, it may not be unreasonable
for Congress to prescribe a milder form of liability than that provided where, as will
usually be the case under the Securities Act, the omission relates to information which
Congress has specifically determined ought to have been given to the investors. In any
case the point at issue is whether the existing provision in the Securities Act is too s.vere,
not whether the existing provision of the Securities Exchange Act is too lenient.
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liability for literally true but misleading statements too far or to contract
it unduly.
A more important recommendation by the committee is its advocacy of
the proposition vigorously but unsuccessfully pressed on Congress at
the time of the amendment of Section 11 in 1934, that liability for un-
intentional false statements should be limited to cases in which the
plaintiff can prove reliance. The present section does not require reliance
on the registration statement, regardless of whether the misstatement
therein was fraudulent or merely negligent, with the exception that such
reliance must be proved if, prior to the plaintiff's acquisition of the
security, the issuer had made generally available to its security holders
an earning statement covering a period of one year beginning after the
effective date of registration.
The committee suggests that reliance be required except in cases of
actual fraud, but that reliance be defined "in such manner as to protect
one who indirectly relies upon false and misleading statements, as, for
example, one who relies upon the advice of another who has actually re-
lied upon a false or misleading statement contained in the registration
statement, or one who relies upon false or misleading statements con-
tained in a prospectus, which false or misleading statements were also
contained in substance in the registration statement."
As indicated at the beginning of this article, however, a large and im-
portant class of security holders which the law ought to protect, if it can
do so without undue hardship to security distributors, is that class which
relies neither on careful perusal of registration statements or prospectuses
or on the advice of those who have perused such statements, but rather
on the fact that the securities in question are known to be selling readily
at a particular market or public offering price. The connection between
the effect produced upon a small portion of the public by actual knowl-
edge of particular portions of a registration statement, and a subsequent
much more widespread public impression that a certain newly-issued
security is a desirable purchase at a certain price, is likely to be sub-
stantial and yet practically impossible to prove. Unless, therefore, the
law assumes, as Section 11 of the Securities Act does, that such connec-
tion exists, a large number of persons who have in fact been injuriously
affected by the defendant's untrue statements will be denied recovery,
in the absence of proof that the statements were made fraudulently.
On the other hand, it is probably true that, by assuming such con-
nection, the Act will enable some persons to recover for statements which,
though substantial enough to be deemed material, have not in fact
seriously affected the market in which the plaintiffs bought. Whether
the class that will thus be able to recover, even though they have prob-
ably not been injured by the defendant's act, will be large or small will
depend to some extent upon the interpretation of the word "material."
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Vitally important statements inevitably affect the markets; but there is
considerable likelihood that some statements which will seem material
to a judicial mind have not, in fact, had any appreciable effect upon the
market. 9 Nevertheless, it seems safe to predict that the present omis-
sion of the requirement of reliance from this section will permit many
more deserving than undeserving plaintiffs to recover.
The committee makes two recommendations with respect to the dam-
ages recoverable under this section. The first is that the liability of an
underwriter should be limited to "damages with respect to a total amount
of securities equal to the amount of the portion of such securities under-
written by him and distributed by him to the public." Under the Act as
it now stands, the underwriter is not to be held liable "for damages in
excess of the total price at which the securities underwritten by him and
distributed to the Oublic were offered to the public." The suggested
change has a double aspect: it would reduce the liability of all under-
writers wherever the total damages suffered by investors are less than
the total issue price of the security, and it would exempt altogether an
underwriter who distributed no securities to the public.
To take up the second point first, unless it be assumed that the com-
mittee's phrase "distributed by him to the public" would be construed
to include wholesale as well as retail distribution, the suggested change
would exempt those large underwriters who sell wholly through other
underwriters or dealers-an exemption which is so plainly undesirable
that it may be assumed that the committee did not intend to advocate it.
Even if the phrase does include wholesale distribution, the effect would
still be to exempt English type underwriters wherever such underwriters
were not called upon to take up any of the securities underwritten by
them. The question whether underwriters of that type should be exempt
has already been discussed.
. Furthermore, the value of the first part of the suggested change is
debatable. Under the Act as it now stands, if ten thousand shares were
sold at a public offering price of $100 a share, or $1,000,000 in all, and
a particular underwriter sold one tenth of these, the maximum liability
29. In an opinion dated March 21, 1934, relating to the issuance of a stop order against
the Bondholders' Protective Committee for Cambridge Apartments, the Federal Trade
Commission defined a material fact, in accordance with the view taken in certain EnglLh
cases cited by it, as "a fact which if it had been correctly stated or disclosed vould have
deterred or tended to deter the average prudent investor from purchasing the securities in
question.' According to this definition, the Act reaches only misrepresentation or conceal-
ment of facts which would, in the opinion of the tribunal, have been calculated to affect
the market. This is not quite the same thing as saying that the misrepresentation or
concealment did in fact affect the market. It should be noted, however, that, as indicated
below, no recovery can be had under § 11 even for a material mL tatement if the de-




of such underwriter would be $100,000, and he might be sued for that
amount even though the total damages suffered by all those who invested
in the shares did not exceed $100,000. The proposed amendment ap-
pears to make it legally impossible for the holders of more than one
tenth of the total number of securities issued to sue him. In view of
other provisions of the Act, these plaintiffs would recover much less than
$100,00010 in any case in which the shares sold had a substantial value
in spite of the misrepresentation.
The effect of the existing provision is to limit the liability of any one
underwriter to the entire body of investors, to the amount which he would
have received if there had been no spread between the price which the
underwriter charged the retailer and the price which the public paid to the
latter. The fact that the damage suffered by those who were directly or
indirectly the underwriter's vendees may have been much less than the
amount for which their shares were issued is treated as irrelevant. The
rule adopted is thus a compromise between a rule which would treat all
underwriters as joint adventurers and make each one liable for the entire
loss, and the committee's suggested rule which would seek to limit the
liability of each to the damages applicable to the shares which he distrib-
uted. In view of the fact that the Act allows persons who become liable
to sue one another for contribution (except where the one seeking contri-
bution was fraudulent and the other was not), it is by no means clear that
the compromise is an unreasonable one.
The committee recommends a further amendment of Section 11 which
would put the burden on the plaintiff of proving that the damages which
he has suffered through a decline in the value of the purchased security
were caused by a misrepresentation or omission in the registration state-
ment, instead of putting the burden on the defendant to prove that some
portion of the damages suffered was due to other causes. As indicated
earlier in this article, an attempt to separate that portion of a plaintiff's
damages which results from the defendant's misrepresentation from that
which results from other causes will in many cases prove extremely dif-
ficult, if not absolutely impossible. An enterprise may have a serious
inherent weakness which is concealed or misrepresented in the registra-
tion statement. This weakness may be one of a number of factors, the
combined effect of which is to cause the enterprise to collapse or to
operate so unsuccessfully as to bring about very serious depreciation in
the market value of its securities. A rule which placed the burden of
distinguishing between damage due to the misrepresentation and damage
due to other causes upon the plaintiff would, because of his inability
30. Section 11 (g) provides that the amount recoverable shall in no case exceed the
public offering price. Where the securities were bought at that price and still have some
value, the amount recoverable would be less than that price.
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to prove the amount of the first type of damages, inevitably leave remedi-
less some plaintiffs who undoubtedly suffered damage because of the de-
fendant's misrepresentation. On the other hand, the rule now embodied
in the section, which places the burden on the defendants, will in some
cases enable plaintiffs who are lucky enough to discover material mis-
representations in the registration statement to recover losses which are
in all probability due largely to other causes but which cannot definitely
be proved to be due to such causes.
It is doubtful whether it will be, as a general rule, any easier for de-
fendants to prove what portion of the damages is due to other causes
than it would be for plaintiffs to prove what portion of the damages is
due to the misrepresentation, so that the usual basis for placing the
burden of proof upon defendants-the fact that the evidence on a par-
ticular issue is likely to be more accessible to them than to the plaintiffs
-- seems inapplicable. It should be borne in mind, however, that the
defendants have by hypothesis circulated in the most public manner
possible a material misrepresentation, and that even though no proof of
reliance thereon by the plaintiff is required, the probability is that this
misrepresentation has directly or indirectly been influential in inducing
the plaintiff to buy, or at any rate in inducing him to buy at an inflated
market price. Plaintiff, on the other hand, is entirely innocent, and if a
choice must be made between leaving him without a remedy and allow-
ing him to recover in full for a loss which was probably due only in part
to the defendant's act, it seems fairer on the whole to run the risk of some
plaintiffs' recovering too much than to make it impossible for many de-
serving plaintiffs to recover anything. It is not without significance that,
even at common law, the New York Court of Appeals has held that
where the collapse of a corporation whose bonds the plaintiff had bought
was due to the combined effect of an inherent weakness in the enter-
prise, which was misrepresented by the seller of the bonds, and of other
causes, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover for his entire loss.3 1
It should be noted in this connection that even when the failure of the
enterprise is due chiefly to causes unconnected with the misrepresenta-
tion, the plaintiff's entire loss may in a sense be caused by that mis-
representation, inasmuch as the misrepresentation may have been the
primary factor in inducing the plaintiff to buy and to continue to hold
the security. In instances in which this can be proved to have been the
case, there is a good deal to be said in favor of allowing the plaintiff to
recover his entire loss even though the defendant can prove that a de-
finite portion of the shrinkage in value of the securities was due to other
causes?' Section 11 as now phrased contains a provision "that if the
31. Hotaling v. A. B. Leach & Co., Inc., 247 N. Y. 84, 159 N. E. 870 (1928).
32. For cases allowing full recovery under such circumstances in an action of deceit
see Fottler v. Moseley, 179 Mass. 295, 60 N. E. 788 (1901) (misrepresentation inducin;
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defendant proves that any portion or all of such damage represents other
than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such part
of the registration statement,... not being true ... , such, portion of or
all such damages shall not be recoverable." This language would seem
to relieve defendants from a portion of their liability in the case sup-
posed, since part of the plaintiff's damages will have been proved to
have been due to causes other than depreciation in value resulting from
the untruth. Thus the section in the present form, although imposing a
severe burden on defendants, will exempt them from liability under some
circumstances in which liability might not unreasonably be imposed.83
If the provisions of Section 11 with respect to reliance, burden of
proof, and damages in actual operation enable many investors to recover
for losses which are not-in fact the result of any fraudulent or negligent
error or omission in a registration statement, the fault is not likely to be
due to any unsoundness of the provisions of the section as abstract legal
propositions. It is more likely to be attributable to the inability of
judges, and more particularly juries, to administer fairly and intelligently
an act which places such heavy burdens of proof on classes of defendants,
who in the majority of cases will probably be persons of greater wealth
than the plaintiffs. In personal injury cases, defendants who are be-
lieved by juries to be rich-and, a fortiori, defendants who are believed to
be insured-are, despite their superior ability to hire able lawyers, prob-
ably on the whole at a disadvantage when sued by relatively un-
prosperous plaintiffs. It may be that juries will develop undue partisan-
ship in favor of plaintiffs suing under Section 11, but the fact that the
latter claim to have suffered in pocketbook alone and not in body makes
the analogy to personal injury suits too imperfect to be helpful. In the
absence of adequate grounds for predicting that the Act will be unfairly
administered, one may reasonably assume that the tribunals which ad-
minister it will be impartial, and judge the soundness of its provisions
on the basis of that assumption.
plaintiff to cancel order to sell stock-plaintiff entitled to recover for any depredation in
value occurring while the misrepresentation continued to operate as an inducement to holding
the stock); Smith v. Duffy, 57 N. J. L. 679, 32 Atl. 371 (Ct. Err. & App. 1895) (misrepre-
sentation inducing purchase of stock---similar result).
33. Section 11 is perhaps even more important for the pressure which it puts on cor-
porate executives, directors, and underwriters to be honest and careful in stating facts
in a registration statement than for the relief which it gives to purchasers who have
suffered by reason of misstatements and omissions. It may be doubted, however, whether
the changes which the committee suggests would so weaken the Section that it would no
longer operate as an effective deterrent to fraud or negligence. The objection to those
changes is rather that stated in the text, that they would deny relief to many plaintiffs
who are fairly entitled to it.
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Amendments to Section Twelve
The committee's report also suggests several amendments to Section
12. That section imposes liability upon all sellers of securities, includ-
ing securities exempted from the registration provisions of the Act, in
favor of persons purchasing directly from them. No liability exists un-
less the sale has been made by the use of some instrumentality of inter-
state commerce or of the mails and has also been made "by means of a
prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement
of a material fact or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading." The purchaser may, under such circum-
stances, tender the security if he still has it, and recover the considera-
tion paid with interest, or may recover damages if he no longer owns
the security.
The most important of the committee's suggestions are that reliance
by the purchaser be required, and that the damage provision be modified.
The argument in favor of requiring reliance is much more persuasive
with respect to this section than with respect to Section 11. A defendant
who is sued under Section 12 may be a small local dealer whose mis-
representations have had no effect on the general market but have
harmed only those purchasers from him who relied upon them. Under
the present form of this section, a plaintiff must indeed prove that he
bought from the defendant and that the sale to him was made by means
of a prospectus or oral communication which included a material false-
hood. It is not altogether clear, however, that he must prove that he
bought in reliance upon that falsehood. If he did not do so, there is no
adequate ground of policy for permitting him to recover. The com-
mittee is right, therefore, in insisting that the Act would be improved by
a specific requirement of reliance. However, the courts are accustomed
to requiring reliance in cases of misrepresentation, and, although the
language of Section 12 is somewhat ambiguous, the prospect that courts
will permit recovery in the absence of reliance seems remote.
With regard to the damage provision, the committee suggests that the
plaintiff be required to sustain the burden of proof that the damage re-
sulted from the falsehood. The objections to placing this burden of
proof upon plaintiffs are substantially the same under this section as
under Section 11. Nevertheless, something may be said for confining
a rule about burden of proof, which contains a considerable element of
harshness on defendants, to those who take part in the original creation
of the securities and for exempting mere retail dealers from that burden,
at least in cases in which the latter have been guilty of negligence rather
than of fraud.
The committee also suggests that maximum damages in cases in which
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the plaintiff no longer owns the security be limited to the amount which
the plaintiff paid for it. The existing section adopts that limitation where
the plaintiff still has the security and is in a position to return it, but
lays down no rule for ascertaining damages where the plaintiff has
parted with it. If, in the absence of any statutory provision, the analogy
of the federal rule in deceit were to be followed in the latter case, dam-
ages could rarely, if ever, exceed the amount which the plaintiff had
paid. 4 On the other hand, it is probably the law that in an action for
breach of warranty a plaintiff who paid $100 for a security which was
worth nothing, but which would have been worth $150 if the warranty on
which he relied had been true, can recover $150. If this be so, the
breach of warranty analogy might in some cases lead to the curious result
that a plaintiff could increase his measure of damages under Section 12
by parting with his security. Such a situation would rarely arise, how-
-ever, and, if it did, it is unlikely that the court would permit the re-
covery of more than $100 under the section as it now stands.
Amendment to Section Nineteen
The committee suggests that the provision of Section 19a, which ex-
•empts from liability persons who rely in good faith on any rule or regula-
tion of the Commission, be broadened so as to give the same protection
to persons who rely upon an opinion in writing of counsel for the Com-
mission. As the committee points out, many questions of great im-
portance to security distributors are not covered by any regulation of
the Commission but only by opinions of the Commission's counsel. This
:sugges'tion of the committee would appear to be a desirable reform.
Amendment to Section Twenty-two
The report also recommends that cases arising under the Act should
be subject to removal from state to federal courts in the same manner as
most other cases arising under federal laws. Section 22a of the pres-
ent Act follows the precedent set by the federal Employer's Liability
Act in denying removal. The principal objections to permitting removal
is that there are a relatively small number of federal trial courts, and that
to allow defendants to remove all cases to the federal courts would en-
able them in many instances to remove the case to a point remote from
the plaintiff's home and inconvenient for him. It may be doubted, how-
34. For the federal rule in deceit see Smith v. Bolles, 132 U. S. 125 (1889). There
is some tendency to adopt a similar rule in actions for breach of warranty, but perhap3
most of the federal courts would agree that in such an action the plaintiff is entitled to
measure his damages by the value which the property would have had if the representations
had been true and that the price which he paid or agreed to pay is merely evidence of
such value. Johnston Mfg. Co. v. Wilson Thread Co., 269 Fed. 555 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
See WILasTo, SALs (2d ed. 1924) § 613.
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ever, whether a provision for removal of cases arising under the Act
would often have the effect of transferring the litigation to a point farther
away from the plaintiff's home. Under conditions which prevail in the
business of security distribution, most of the persons who will be suable
under Section 11 with respect to misrepresentations in the registration
statement, and a very large proportion of those who will be suable under
Section 12 for misrepresentations in sales of securities made by them,
will reside in or near the larger cities and will not, except by accident, be
subject to service of process elsewhere. There are few large cities in the
United States which do not have a federal district court. It may be
doubted, therefore, whether a provision for removal would seriously in-
convenience plaintiffs. It would have the indubitable advantage of re-
ducing somewhat the chances of a lack of uniformity in the construction
of the Act. Each of the ten Circuit Courts of Appeals could establish
substantial uniformity within its circuit, and there is perhaps a stronger
tendency on the part of such courts to follow one another's decisions than
is the case with state courts of last resort05 There is something to be
said also for the proposition that, in the country as a whole, the
federal district courts are more competent to deal fairly and intelligently
with litigation of this type than are the state trial courts. The suggested
amendment is therefore probably desirable, but hardly of major im-
portance.
Readers of this criticism of the committee's report will probably feel
that the writer has given greater emphasis to the harm which might come
to investors through amendment of the Act than to the hardships im-
posed upon distributors of securities by the severity and vagueness of
some of its provisions. Emphasis has, in fact, been designedly put on the
investor's side of the case. The committee report, although not wholly
ignoring the investor's needs, approaches the problem primarily from
the standpoint of persons engaged in the business of security distribution.
Where provisions of the Act seem harsh or inconvenient when viewed
from the distributor's standpoint, the report recommends that these
provisions be modified, with little or no attempt to envisage the possible
injury to investors which might result from such modification. Its pur-
pose is to persuade the organized body of American lawyers, and through
that body the public at large, that justice to security distributors re-
quires that the Securities Act be radically amended. The primary pur-
pose of the present article is to insist that justice to security purchasers
requires that no safeguard which the Act now provides for investors be
removed until the possible injury to them which such removal might
bring about has been thoroughly canvassed.
35. Regardless of whether cases are tried in the state or in the federal courts, the
unifying influence of the Supreme Court of the United States will be limited both by the
cost of appeals to Washington and by the unwillingness of that court to grant certiorari
except in cases involving what it regards as important questions of law.
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